Maybe We Can Try Again

A lot is being asked of 30K troops who are being placed in unenviable positions

Putin wasn't kidding when he said he was launching a "special military machine operation". Relative to what the Russian war machine brought to the edge this is not yet all-out war.

I would say almost 30,000 Russian troops have crossed over into Ukraine then far. A small portion of the force assembled.

Moreover, the Russians are (so far) waging the war in a manner that keeps civilian losses to a minimum and fifty-fifty trying to minimally disrupt civilian life.

The Russian functioning could have opened with strikes against ability plants and the electric filigree (both bombed past U.s. in Yugoslavia) that left civilians in shock and without power, and with ballistic and cruise missile strikes on Ukrainian army barracks.

Instead, the Russian enterprise is so far conducted in a way that limits not just Ukrainian civilian, but fifty-fifty Ukrainian war machine losses. The Russians take barely used their arms.

It's as if so far Putin is trying to carry less a state of war, and more a 1968-style policing activity.

Kiev's arroyo has been but the opposite, to distribute weapons to civilians. To inquire them to "make Molotov cocktails" and to flick and publish Russian troop movements.

Information technology'due south a contest. Kiev is trying to induct the populace into a people'south war and give Moscow the kind of state of war information technology does not want. And Moscow is doing everything information technology can from its side to not take that happen merely to instead wage a minimally confusing regime-alter.

Russia wants the populace passive, Ukraine wants it as mobilized as possible. Thus in that location is expert reason for Russian federation to refrain from using all the firepower it has, but it has made the life of its troops more hard.

This economy-of-force approach is really typical of how Russian federation operates. It will try something limited and modest-scale first then escalate into something bigger when that hits a wall and so on.

In that location are proficient reasons to do it the Russian way, simply in that location is besides practiced reason non to. Certainly on the negative side is that it ways asking a lot of their troops.

The brazen helicopter attack on Gostromel Aerodrome was the most dramatic example of this, but really all Russian troops that accept been committed are being asked to practice brazen stuff with not much encompass.

Small units of 800 men are beingness told to drive along a road 50 kilometers into the enemy's rear and to go around major cities.

It has been less Ogarkov and more Tukhachevsky. Less the long-range fires apocalypse of not-contact warfare and more the deep battle of columns racing for the rear and fighting fights that are very much contact, sometimes later on driving into an ambush or running into Ukrainians caput-on.

The troops themselves have done rather well really, but of class there is a limit to how far 30K troops tin can become.

I leave you with commentary by two other observers. You don't have to take their word as gospel, merely something worth considering.

Michael Kofman (maybe the number 1 authority on the Russian armed forces outside of Russia):

Some very early impressions of the last ii days. Information technology's an performance with maximalist war aims, and Moscow's thinking on this state of war seems to have been colored by war optimism. It looked as though Russian forces were expecting a quicker Ukrainian military collapse and easier gains.

Early on campaign to knock out Ukrainian air defenses and air force had mixed results, Russian aerospace forces aren't especially practiced at suppression or destruction of air defenses. Most of the strikes in the opening phase were via cruise missiles. Ukrainian air forcefulness still has some aircraft up.

A brazen heliborne assault to take Hostomel airport with a modest airborne chemical element was a puzzling movement. I incertitude the goal was to land more airborne at a contested airdrome easily covered past artillery and MLRS. Likely they expected to concur out for ground reinforcements.

So far we've seen only a fraction of the Russian force arrayed for the functioning. Unclear if Russian forces reached initial objectives, simply best estimate is they expected more than rapid gains and less resistance.

Russian forces seem to exist avoiding employ of massed fires, except maybe around Kharkiv, focusing on trying to make a speedy accelerate. Expect they volition revert to much larger use of fires when frustrated. Not seeing much in the way of cyber and less electronic warfare effects than many anticipated.

Russian forces are mainly sticking to the route network (equally in 2014-2015). Early advances made by recon troops, only driving along roads left support units open to ambushes. Already signs of urban warfare and firefights in cities.

There has been heavy fighting around Kharkiv and in Sumy. Russian forces tried to advance past Okhtyrka, and it looks like they're attempting to become around Kharkiv. There is also an advance due west of Sumy to Konotop. This is a very incomplete moving picture.

Russian forces entered from Belarus and went through Chernobyl exclusion zone to Dymer. Early on signs of fighting on outskirts of Kyiv in Obolonskyi distict today. They're clearly going for the capital.

Principal breakout appears to be in the due south from Crimea. Russian forces pushed to Kherson, and Melitopol. There's sustained fighting for Kherson still and around Antonovsky bridge. Some early signs they may have entered Mykolaiv, but probably but a recon chemical element.

Russian forces retain significant quantitative and qualitative superiority. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated resolve and resilience. Russian conventional overmatch, such as it is, may not translate into attaining their maximalist political aims. This is just the opening of the war.

We should accept care making assumptions on how this war volition progress based on the opening 24-48 hours. The Russian military clearly tried something. I recall information technology at best yielded mixed results for them. They will adjust.

What's articulate is that is that if Moscow had hopes of quick and piece of cake gains, they were terribly optimistic.

My primary concern is that over time the Russian military machine may revert to heavy utilize of firepower, and this will result in immense destruction, and large civilian casualties.

Andrei Zhukov (a random Twitterer simply to an extent he is on to something):

Russia is bombing fuel and ammunition depots, but the Russian regular army does not bomb the places where Ukrainian armored vehicles and personnel assemble. Why? Because they still hope that their fairy tales about friendship, peace and the international volition work.

Due to the fact that the dark of February 24 did not strike the barracks of the AFU, the Russian army is now suffering losses

Russian troops are moving quickly in small columns from one city to some other, without even getting a foothold in information technology and not clearing it from the partisans. The logistics support that goes afterwards them comes under fire from the Ukrainian army.

The Russian regular army currently does not control a unmarried city - they just drive by, leaving the cities in the rear. The Ukrainian military calmly enter these cities and try to strike, so it was in Sumy.

Russian planes are not at work - they simply exercise not bomb the columns of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, still hoping for desertion and the transition to the Russian side. Again, THIS DOES NOT Work, a tolerant attitude towards the Ukrainian armed services has led to losses, prisoners.

For example. Rosgvardia and OMON are going together with the military to "take Kiev"(!). Internal troops should follow the armed forces AFTER the army destroys the Ukrainian army in a given sector. This did non happen. They just get ahead into Kiev blindly.

The Ukrainian army will still be destroyed, only the Russian army is suffering unjustified losses that could accept been avoided

Bully for 30K troops and 48 hours — would have been farther along if more than of the assembled forces and fires were committed from the onset

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Source: https://www.sott.net/article/464955-Putin-is-waging-a-halfway-war-and-it-shows